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“Innovation Shift” to the Emerging Economies: Cases from IT and Heavy Industries1 
 
 One of the most dramatic developments of the past decade has been the offshoring of 
technology and product development by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) to emerging 
economies (EEs).  This trend appears contrary to a historical trajectory in which large firms 
evolved increasingly integrated organizational structures, followed management strategies that 
focused on protecting their core competencies and the resources that gave them sustainable 
competitive advantage, and also devoted considerable resources to the development of human 
capital. All of these activities were very much geographically embedded, and national innovation 
policies were predicated on this embeddedness. While a number of studies have documented the 
increasing globalization of R&D activities (e.g., Thursby and Thursby, 2006), the implications 
for national policies have most often been considered in terms of specific threats to jobs or 
vaguely conceived notions of “national competitiveness.”  Less attention has been paid to the 
content of this aspect of globalization and the broader transformations that may be occurring, 
For decades MNEs have cut costs by offshoring some production and engineering 
activities to lower cost regions of the world. They have also established development centers to 
adapt their global products to meet the distinctive needs of countries with poorly educated and 
low income workers and consumers, and poorly developed infrastructures. As these processes 
took place, the MNEs retained their system integration and top-of-the-value-chain activities in 
their home countries, or at least in other sites within the Triad (North America, Europe and 
Japan). The central strategic concern was for the MNE to maintain tight control over whatever 
gave it competitive advantage over other firms. To have sustained competitive advantage a firm 
needed to have resources that were valuable (by giving the firm the ability to exploit 
opportunities or neutralize threats), rare among the firm’s current and potential competitors, 
difficult to imitate, and not easily substitutable (Barney, 1991).   
Is the current wave of offshoring a linear extension of these past trends, with Triad MNEs 
still orchestrating global activities to maintain their strategic advantage? Or is something 
different happening? Are decision-makers fully accounting for the implications for the long-term 
strategic interests of firms when they move top-of-the-value chain and system integration 
activities to emerging economies?  Does the current wave at once represent a change in 
longstanding theories about the organizational integration of core activities and a change in the 
geographical stickiness of innovative activity?   
In this paper we first review the organizational and innovation theory that underlie 
current thinking about industrial development and national competitiveness. We then turn to a 
description of a study of technology offshoring projects in a number of industries. From this 
study we present descriptions of the factors motivating offshoring, and the processes by which 
offshoring evolved at two IT and two heavy industries firms.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The research described here was supported by the National Science Foundation (Societal Dimensions of 
Engineering, Science & Technology, SES-0431755, and the Human and Social Dynamics Programs, 
SES-0527584), and the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or 
recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the funders. 
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Organizational paths and integrated innovation 
 
 In a widely accepted interpretation, Alfred Chandler (1990) attributed the success of U.S. 
industrial firms from the late 19th century through the first two or three decades after World War 
II to their effective exploitation of economies of scale and scope. To achieve and maintain 
economies of scale and scope, Chandler wrote, the successful firms built strengths in production 
(ensuring that economies of scale could be obtained), marketing and distribution (seeking both 
economies of scale and scope), and management (to efficiently coordinate resources and to 
effectively respond to new threats and opportunities in the environment).  Early success in 
achieving the economies of scale and scope by the giant U.S. firms essentially kept others from 
entering the rich U.S. market. When the U.S. firms moved offshore it was to further exploit the 
advantages they had derived from their economies of scale and scope. Here again, their strengths 
in scale and scope made their position in global markets virtually unassailable. The widely 
followed prescription until recently was that firms needed to maintain tightly integrated, well-
coordinated structures. 
 National innovation and technology policies were developed in correspondence to, and 
interaction with, these corporate organizational structures and strategies. In the United States 
innovation policies were effective in supporting the U.S. rise to international leadership in 
technology in the 20th century. Notable among these policies were: strong national and local 
support for land grant colleges that emphasized practical technology, strong antitrust policies to 
spur competition, heavy government spending on technology (much of it related to military 
research and procurement, but also substantial amounts on medical research) (Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 1998). The overall U.S. support for technology, increasing strength of U.S. research 
universities, and strong institutional support for entrepreneurship attracted and gave 
opportunities to an unprecedented population of talented people seeking careers in technology. 
At first it extended these opportunities to Americans who in the past could not have afforded 
higher education. After World War II the U.S. also attracted the best and brightest young science 
and engineering students from around the world, initially a supply greatly enriched by a 
European exodus, and then by an influx from a widening number of emerging economies. 
Additionally, U.S. firms strongly supported engineering programs through internship and coop 
programs, and sometimes money and equipment. 
 During the last decades of the 20th century many American firms faltered in their 
competition with fast rising Japanese rivals. Chandler (1993) argued that this was because the 
U.S. firms had allowed their previous strengths to deteriorate.  Other observers had a different 
interpretation. In one of the most cited business articles of the late twentieth century Prahalad 
and Hamel (1990) argued that U.S. firms were failing in competition with the Japanese because 
senior management conceived of their companies as portfolios of discrete business units, 
divesting those with weaker returns regardless of possible synergies with other units or 
possibilities for future strategies. Still others argued that the competitive environment had 
shifted, and firms needed to adjust. Michael Porter (1985) introduced the concept of “value 
chains.”  The value chain is a series of value-generating activities, and a firm’s profits, according 
to Porter, depend on minimizing the cost of each link in the chain. Based on one form of value 
chain analysis or another, managers at many firms decided to outsource activities as a means of 
lowering costs.   
 The focus on “core competencies” led firms to shed various activities to organizations 
outside the firm, and to develop stronger relationships with external organizations.  One form 
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that was widely expected to become predominant was the “networked firm.” Firms were said to 
be “hollowing out.”  Later, the locus of innovative activity was widely thought to be in the 
process of being transferred from large firms to entrepreneurial firms, such as those in Silicon 
Valley (Saxenian, 1996; Lee et al., 2000). We would argue that a more fundamental (but related) 
change is now occurring. This is a change in the patterns of “geographical stickiness” of 
technological development and innovation (Von Hippel, 1994).   
 The core competency focus required developing supply chains, but did not imply 
anything about the types of firms that should be in the supply chains.  Depending upon the 
industry, firm, and the time period, firms of different sizes and types were used as suppliers.  
Initially some firms sought small suppliers whose costs were lower and were in a weaker 
negotiating position on price.  Over time, however, there was a consolidation among suppliers in 
some industries. As suppliers were given a broader range of responsibilities with the move to 
modular systems, they further increased their size and capabilities (e.g. Baldwin and Clark, 1997; 
Schilling, 2000; Sturgeon, 2002).  Flextronics, for example, began assembling circuit boards, 
nearly went bankrupt, and is now a vertically-integrated electronics supplier with over $15 
billion in sales and 100,000 employees.  Its growth and transformation occurred by:  
 
… bulking up, flouting some key tenets of New Economy wisdom. While many gurus rave 
about virtual corporations, Flextronics and its rivals have been quietly picking up the abandoned 
brick-and-mortar pieces and reassembling them into new versions of vertically integrated 
empires. The new age production experts are happily shelling out billions to acquire competitors 
along with factories once owned by Siemens, IBM, and Nortel. To broaden their services, they 
are also acquiring top design and engineering firms—specialists in creating anything from 
customized semiconductors to prototypes of futuristic wireless-Web phones. (BusinessWeek 
August 28, 2000) 
 
 Although initially only non-core, commodity products were outsourced, supplier 
capabilities expanded alongside other changes in the outsourcing firm and suppliers began to 
provide proprietary technologies, such as components supplied to Apple for its iPod. This raises 
under-researched questions regarding who controls technology value chains. One might note the 
recent highly-publicized instances where Triad multinationals have surrendered entire products 
to firms that once were smaller producers of components in emerging economies, such as 
Siemens cellular telephones (to BenQ) or the IBM PC (to Lenovo).  
 The value chain shifts in electronics began to occur in a wider range of industries in 
recent years, representing a fundamental shift in the types of technology obtained from suppliers.  
Perhaps most notably in the IT industry, but increasingly throughout all industries, technology 
and innovation are increasingly sourced from other firms, and smaller technology firms have 
become a source of innovation and technology acquisition to a greater extent. This would seem 
to be part of a new strategy quite different from the Porter outsourcing model in which a firm 
outsources commodity components, but carefully protects core technologies and capabilities by 
keeping them within the firm.  In part the basic strategy of “core competencies” was redefined to 
be quite flexible and refer, ex post facto, to those components that remained in the firm while 
other components were, by definition, not “core” even if they involved proprietary technology 
upon which a product was based (again, the iPod example is most widely known)2. We suggest 
                                                 
2 The “correct” strategic approach tends to be known only long after the decision as made, as the contrasting cases of 
Apple’s iPod and IBM’s operating system case illustrates.  Of course, it could be argued that Apple learned from 
IBM, and is controlling its iPod suppliers more effectively than IBM did with Microsoft. 
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that this use of core competency was rather “flexible” and, at this point, may no longer be a 
useful concept for prescribing which activities should be kept within the firm’s boundaries.  We 
find that if control over key technologies is the source of power in technology value chains, 
Triad MNEs may also be losing this traditional basis for competitiveness. As Business Week  
(2000) observed in their analysis of contract manufacturers seven years ago, “as the role of 
contractors grows, the brand name on a product may not indicate the real power behind an 
industry.” 
The outsourcing of innovation that is core to a company’s competitiveness grew out of a 
number of changes in organizational form, practice, and of engineering and innovation practices. 
Some relate to the growing practice of MNEs in industries ranging from pharmaceuticals to 
microprocessors of supporting entrepreneurial firms to explore and develop various 
technological options, rather than doing this in-house. Some relate to firms outsourcing the 
production of modular components, with the expectation that subcontractors will develop the 
technology embodied in the modules.  
The changes also involved new relationships between large and small firms and the 
growth of technology entrepreneurship. The development of innovation and technology 
acquisition strategies by large firms is a very recent change that has resulted from three major 
shifts in engineering and technology, organization, and financing.   
 
(1) In the face of more intense competition from East Asian firms, MNEs were 
pushed to overcome the notorious “Not Invented Here” syndrome. Indeed, 
many even turned to modular designs that encouraged suppliers to take 
responsibility for design and innovation.  
(2) Organizational definitions of core competencies and strategic resources 
changed. Many MNEs began investing their research dollars in technology 
entrepreneurial firms rather than in their own R&D centers. Organizational 
structures became more fluid, as firms routinely sold off divisions and 
acquired others, moving from one industry to another. Competitive advantage 
in some products depended on technologies that were traditionally identified 
with other industries, such as happened when electronics began to provide 
competitive distinctiveness in automobiles.  
(3) Shifts in the financial/investment community produced new support for 
startups. Most notably there was a shift in investment in intangible assets and 
investments by large firms in startups and small firms (sometimes as a first 
step toward acquisition, but sometimes to support partners with a common 
interest in advancing the larger firm’s networks, standards or system of 
complementary assets).   
  
 In this paper we draw on data from a large study of the globalization of technology 
development to emerging economies to focus on the following three areas. 
 
1. The motivating factors. What were the main reasons given for developing offshore 
engineering, R&D, and other innovation activities? How systematically did MNEs 
evaluate their options before deciding to offshore technology work? In hindsight, did they 
achieve their objectives? 
 5
2. The processes. How did MNEs go about deciding what activities to offshore and    
where to locate them? How did they go about establishing these activities (e.g., go it 
alone, use foreign partners).  Were there common evolutionary paths? 
3. The outcomes. Where do current processes seem to be taking the firms? How well do 
they fit the longer term interests of the firms? Were there impacts on technology 
development value chains?  
 
 We begin with descriptions of our methods and our sample. We then present our findings 
in each of the three areas. 
 
THE STUDY 
 
Methods. A comparative case study method was used to examine the issues of interest. The 
focus was on learning about emerging practices and identifying the evolution of offshore 
innovation through detailed accounts by those directly involved in setting strategy, managing the 
offshoring, and in conducting the engineering/innovation work on and offshore.  We employed 
comparative case studies (Yin, 2003; and more broadly Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser and Strauss, 
1967) and a linked case study method in which a “case” consisted of a central node of the firm’s 
site in its home country and then its remote sites in EEs.  This was then extended to include 
offshore outsourcing and contracting by adding a tertiary set of nodes of technology 
entrepreneurs who supplied technology and/or engineering/innovation services to the firm either 
to its offshore site or directly to its home country site.  Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted.  Nearly all of these were tape recorded.3  The interview information was 
supplemented by published and unpublished written accounts. At two MNEs we presented our 
findings to groups of managers for feedback to help assess the validity of our descriptions and 
conclusions. As the research proceeded, we also presented our findings before groups of 
academics and government officials in several of the countries. 
 
Sample.  Our sample included sites of firms in the IT software and hardware (including both 
services and products) industries; and in the vehicle, vehicle parts, engineering, electrical and 
heavy electrical systems industries. This provided a wide range of technologies and innovations. 
We identified large companies in each industry that were involved in a significant number of 
offshore engineering activities. This enabled us to examine leading edge and emerging practices 
and changes. We used convenience sampling within this group, inviting leading companies in 
each sector to participate in the study.  We then interviewed managers, project leaders, and 
engineers/technologists at the home country site and in one or more EE site (China, India, 
Mexico).  This yielded 190 interviews at 67 sites of 38 MNEs in eight countries (See Table 1). 
Interviews were also conducted at eight IT firms in India. Respondents were promised 
confidentiality, and so the names of companies discussed in this paper are pseudonyms. 
 
                                                 
3 The study was conducted in collaboration with colleagues in Germany (Pamela Meil, ISF—Munich), Mexico 
(Carlos Acosta, UDLA-Puebla), Tojo Thatchenkerry (George Mason University, with expertise in India), in India 
(Balaji Parthasarathy, IIIT-Bangalore; P. Vigneswara Ilavarasan, IIT-Delhi), China (Wang Zhong-Ming, Zhejiang 
University), Korea (Geon-Cheol Shi Kyunghee University). These colleagues helped us with contacts and interviews 
and greatly stimulated our thinking, the authors, however, are solely responsible for any conclusions reported in this 
paper. 
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 Table 1. Interview Sites 
              Industry   
Electrical, 
Electronics 
Heavy 
Industries: 
Power 
generation, 
vehicle mfg 
IT 
hardware 
or 
software 
Country 
total 
Country           
  US 11 10 7 28 
  Europe  3 2 1 6 
  Japan 1 1   2 
  
South 
Korea  1 1   2 
  Brazil  - 1 - 1 
  China  7 2 3 12 
  Mexico  - 3 - 3 
  India  1 - 8 8 
Industry 
total   24 20 19 63 
 
 Note: Four sites at three other firms in other industries were also part of the study. 
 
 To be included in the study, firms had to have engineering or product development sites 
offshore that had been operating for at least two years. We only included sites engaged in new 
product development or innovation, not those involved in other types of engineering such as 
process engineering or localization.  
The IT firm sample included 12 firms and 19 sites.  Three large IT firms were both IT 
product and services firms. The sample also included 6 small IT firms based offshore that were 
suppliers to the large firms. In this paper we will provide some detailed description of processes 
and outcomes at two of the large IT Firms.  
“All-IT” is a global IT services company that develops and maintains large back office 
systems.  One ALL-IT division we studied (and will discuss here) had developed large data 
management systems that had an installed base dating back more than 30 years. At the time of 
the interviews the division was involved in the development of a very large new system, with 
many of its activities being offshored. We visited three ALL-IT sites in the U.S. and Europe, two 
sites in India and China, and two of its suppliers in those countries. “PC Products” (PCP) is a 
global producer of software for computer applications. We conducted interviews at sites of this 
company and two of its suppliers in the U.S., India, and China. 
The manufacturing firms in our sample included 44 sites.  In this paper we will provide 
some detailed description of processes and outcomes at two of these firms. Again, they are 
identified by pseudonyms in this paper. “Powerstar” is a U.S.-based MNE that has often been 
mentioned in management textbooks as having superior processes for the formation of corporate 
strategy. Powerstar is in a variety of industries producing heavy electrical equipment for a 
number of industrial, utilities and domestic applications. We visited Powerstar sites in China, 
India, Europe and the United States. “EnergySystems” is the power systems division of another 
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highly admired MNE. EnergySystems has operations in Asia, North America, and Europe. We 
interviewed four EnergySystems managers at a site in China, and earlier a number of managers 
from the MNE of which it is a part. 
 
FINDINGS  
 
1. Motivating Factors:   
   
 Both the business and scholarly literatures suggest that firms have three major motives 
for the offshoring of technology development activities: cost cutting, gaining access to new 
markets, gaining access to human resources/technology from new areas (e.g. Thursby and 
Thursby, 2006; Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002). We wanted to look more closely at how these 
and other factors entered into decisions to offshore technology development. 
 The general story of the globalization of IT work to include important activities in India 
and emerging economies is widely known. Much outsourcing was begun in the 1990s, primarily 
for the maintenance of legacy systems and to make Y2K modifications.  Back office 
programming work, particularly on “legacy systems” was spurred by the system modifications 
needed for Y2K. At that time, there were not enough programmers in the U.S. who knew the 
older programming languages, and the increase in short-term work required firms to outsource 
IT.  MNEs than began to seek other cost-savings by outsourcing to India and other countries. 
 In the case of the ALL-IT division, however, the motivation was as much the appearance 
of cost savings as the reality. At the time of our interviews the ALL-IT division was developing a 
new-generation data management system to replace a twenty-year old legacy system.  When this 
project was initiated, some three years before our interviews, ALL-IT had planned to concentrate 
its development activities at a U.S. site that had developed and maintained the current system 
and had a longstanding experience in the industry in which the system was used.. But then, under 
pressure from Wall Street analysts, the head office ordered the division to offshore a certain large 
percentage of its work. No systematic calculations were made of how much money (if any) 
would be saved by the offshoring. The mandate was simply that a certain percentage of work 
would be offshored by a certain date.  
 At PCP, the offshoring occurred over a number of years and in multiple, lower-level 
areas that led to the decision to establish software development and research sites offshore. 
Among the current rationales for establishing offshore development research centers is to access 
talent in the emerging economies and better understand those markes. As a manager in Beijing 
described it, the operations in China could create a huge virtual organization by subcontracting 
components of huge software projects to small technology entrepreneurial firms. When the 
project was over they would not have to lay their own people off. But PCP did not just seek well-
trained talented people in China and India, it helped sponsor university programs to train 
software engineers. And it did not find that a large number of entrepreneurial software 
development firms it could rely on already existed in China. It actively encouraged the formation 
of these firms, and then supported them. 
At Powerstar the motivations for outsourcing technology development to emerging 
economies were a mix of cost cutting, gaining access to new markets, and gaining talented 
human resources. But the offshoring was actually begun almost as a by-product of a global 
rationalization of engineering activities that was sparked by the acquisition of a major European 
subsidiary some years ago.  Engineering teams from the U.S, firm and the European subsidiary 
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subsequently began work on a global development project, which eventually led to the location 
of a new site in China, described below. 
At EnergySystems’ site in China the primary motivation for the offshoring of engineering 
work was a desire to secure business working on newly planned huge governmental power 
infrastructure projects. A relatively unsuccessful plant owned by a European multinational was 
taken over by EnergySystems. EnergySystems was confident its superior managerial techniques 
would allow it to turn around this operation. 
 In brief, then, the motivations for offshoring technological activities to emerging 
economies in our sample companies broadly fit the categories previously identified – cost 
cutting, access to market, access to human and other technological resources. Yet, things were 
sometimes more complicated than the simple categorization might suggest. At All-IT it seemed 
to be the appearance of cost savings, even more than the real potential for cost savings. Indeed, 
in interview after interview managers told us they doubted if there had been any significant 
savings in their particular area (Many mentioned significant costs to offshoring that seem to have 
been ignored.). At PCP the primary motivation was access to human resources (and 
entrepreneurial firms), but in some cases these were resources that PCP helped to create in the 
emerging economies. At Powerstar there was a mix of motives, but these became salient only 
after new opportunities were revealed as a by-product of an acquisition in Europe. At 
EnergySystems the primary motive was initially to gain favor with the Chinese government, but 
with the conviction that EnergySystems’ superior management systems could overcome the 
problems that had faced another MNE trying to gain the same advantage.    
 
2. Processes:  
 
 The processes by which the MNEs in our study chose the sites, activities, partners, etc., 
and those by which they projected their technology development activities into the emerging 
economies were also somewhat messier than theory might suggest. We found that the processes 
tended to be incremental. They were guided by no explicit strategy.  
 Several patterns of offshore development occurred in the companies we studied.  There 
were some similarities among the IT companies that went offshore for back office work, among 
companies that went to localize and market products, and among those that went to manufacture 
products or to work on infrastructure projects. But, regardless of industry, all the firms we 
studied developed their offshore engineering activities and their engagement with local 
technology entrepreneurs through similar, step-by-step, incremental processes, which we term 
“value chain engineering progression”. 
 The U.S. IT MNEs we studied had longstanding relationships with smaller offshore firms 
dating back at least to the efforts to cope with Y2K. By the time the Y2K “crisis” had passed, 
offshore firms such as Infosys, Tata Consulting Services, and WIPRO were large well-
established firms, experienced in working with U.S. and other Triad MNEs (Some, such as 
WIPRO, were originally joint ventures with U.S. firms). They had begun to expand their efforts 
to meet other software development needs.  The H-1B visa program in the U.S., which provided 
special visas for certain categories of workers, was used extensively by offshore IT companies to 
locate their project teams in the U.S. to work with clients (Hira and Hira, 2005; Salzman and 
Biswas, 2001).  The large number of Indians educated at U.S. engineering and other schools (and 
sometimes with entrepreneurial experience in Silicon Valley or managerial experience at 
American IT firms) provided the human capital base for developing IT company management 
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capacity offshore by offshore companies, entrepreneurial startups (e.g. Saxenian, 2006), and 
U.S.-based companies developing technology development sites in India.  The Y2K experience 
also increased the “comfort level” for U.S. MNEs in relying on remote technical services.   
 The All-IT division we studied had earlier established a subsidiary in India, but because 
of restrictions on foreign ownership, sold the subsidiary to an Indian firm in the early 1990s. 
When the division reentered India it used local contractors.  These were small companies that 
initially provided maintenance services for legacy software. Next, the division outsourced 
components of the large new system it was developing to two Indian firms. As was mentioned 
above, offshoring increased as the division was mandated to increase the percentage of its work 
done offshore and as the division found that once it had offshored some work, it needed to 
offshore even more work to address new problems related to the transfer of tacit knowledge, 
general logistics, and coordination.  
 Initially, the work offshored to India was handled by contractors. But then, in response to 
concern by outside analysts that the company was becoming overly reliant on offshore 
contractors, ALL-IT established a “captive site.”  The site was located in Bangalore (primarily 
because of Bangalore’s reputation as an IT center). Initially, again, ALL-IT intended to do only 
legacy development work at the Indian site. This soon changed, however, both because the IT 
staff in India insisted on doing more challenging work, and because the U.S. staff (which had 
been reduced in size as work was outsourced) no longer had the capability to do it. By the time 
of our interviews in 2006 the work done in the U.S. and India had undergone an almost complete 
reversal from the original intent. As one of the programmers in Bangalore explained: “We 
specialize in our areas of expertise: the US has the knowledge of the legacy systems since they 
developed them and we work on the new systems…we are younger and have learned the new 
programming languages for these systems.” 
 PC-Products (PCP) had traditionally highly centralized its development activities, 
requiring its developers to be co-located.  They had a philosophy similar to the Microsoft 
development approach, as expressed by a software executive: “Microsoft used to believe that 
development was a contact sport; ‘You needed people bumping into each other. In Redmond, 
you wanted your entire development team in the same building. Ideally, they'd be on the same 
floor.’” (Kirsner, 2005).  Similarly, as a manager of software development at PCP explained in 
an interview, “it was always thought that all the developers had to breathe the same air, be under 
the same roof.”  Three things occurred at around the same time (between the late 1990s and 
around 2003) that led to the shift to offshore development work. 
First, an offshore firm, “NewTec”, was started up in the mid-1990s in India by two men. 
One was a returning Indian national who had gone to the U.S. for a graduate education. He had 
worked for a U.S. firm, and then decided to return home because he was “bored with working in 
a large company” and also because he wanted to be near his family.  NewTec began as a product 
company, but it also did sales and service work to fund the product development. It was a sales 
vendor for PCP, but because it had deep development capacity, it began to do some maintenance, 
testing, and development work for PCP on subroutines.  NewTec’s own products found a market 
niche, but, these did not generate high sales volume. Meanwhile, the demand for service work 
(testing, localization) by PCP and others was growing rapidly so All-Tec shifted its focus to 
work for U.S. MNEs. Its founders and many of its high-level technical staff still harbor the goal 
of becoming a product company.  NewTec continually proposes expansion of its work for PCP, 
asking to do greater portions of the component products and, through this knowledge and 
expertise, develop new product modules for PCP’s products. 
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Second, a high-level PCP developer/analyst at the main development site, who was an 
Indian national, wanted to return to India. This programmer had gone to graduate school in the 
U.S. and was now at PCP’s main research campus in the U.S. He proposed establishing a small 
office that would do tools development to support product development at the main research 
campus. With a team of a few other Indian expatriates and some local hires he set up the Indian 
office.  For some expatriates, India offered better career opportunities than those available in the 
U.S. Some saw fewer promotion opportunities in the U.S. and found PCP becoming an 
increasingly staid company. Furthermore, India was changing with more efficient services and 
less government bureaucracy.  As one of the Indian managers who had gone back said: “It’s 
exciting to be here. It’s like Silicon Valley in part. Bangalore feels the same way.”  The goals of 
this lab were evolving.  The immediate goal was the development of tools but the founding 
managers had longer-terms goals that were much broader. As one senior manager described it, 
the India office was: 
 
… not for outsourcing or cost cutting, but to tap the local talent pool, because people here 
[India] chose not to go to US.  Labs in different places will attract different types of people and 
talent and study different types of technology problems.  [This is especially true in] emerging 
markets. To penetrate [these markets], we need to understand what kinds of software make 
sense; not slice and dice [our current product] but understand what people want, not just take 
parts of, or adapt [product X] but understand the local needs for products and solutions that 
might have implications for other markets.  So we’re here to tap into it, in other places; we co-
locate people here and let inspiration come from individuals, from the grassroots. 
 
The third development was that teams in India and China began solving bug problems for 
teams in other countries.  For many years the offices in India and China had concentrated on 
sales. Then, they began to localize PCP products (mostly translating screen commands into local 
languages). Teams were set up to do low-level localization programming.  As part of this 
process, bug reports were posted online. Although the bugs were officially the responsibility of 
the team that “owned” that aspect of development, anyone could offer fixes. In the home office 
managers began noticing a number of fixes coming from China and India. In our interviews at 
these offices, managers commented that they had been able to hire very talented people because 
PCP was a desirable western company to work for and wages were above local market rates.  
However, the localization tasks were relatively simple and these programmers had much greater 
abilities and ambition so they looked for challenges. They also wanted to “prove” to 
headquarters that they were capable of much higher level work.   
The offshore capabilities became more apparent to those in headquarters, and an 
increasing number of foreign-born programmers and developers were rising into the 
management ranks. Together a greater appreciation for offshore capacities developed, as did the 
general prominence of offshore companies 
 In manufacturing there was a similarly gradual progression. After Powerstar acquired a 
major European subsidiary, engineering teams from the U.S, firm and the European subsidiary 
began work on a global development project. Powerstar decided to establish a technology 
development facility in an industrial park around 100 miles from Shanghai. In interviews we 
were given several reasons for this choice. The company had a long-established manufacturing 
facility in the industrial park. The second level manager was a Chinese national who had 
received his graduate degree in the U.S. and joined Powerstar immediately after graduation. This 
man was highly regarded by the Powerstar division managers.  For some time he had wanted to 
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be based in China. This increased the attractiveness of a Chinese site for Powerstar.  The other 
engineers at the Chinese site (eight at the time of our visit) were all Chinese, and all had received 
their engineering degrees from Chinese universities.  Because of intellectual property concerns, 
Powerstar initially confined its activities in China to localization engineering and testing, but the 
site’s activities gradually expanded. One reason for the expansion was the presence of the 
Chinese engineer, who was well-known and trusted by managers in the U.S. There is, however, a 
major constraint on the transfer of activities to China – Powerstar has a core proprietary 
technology. Out of concerns about intellectual property rights it has a company policy that no 
activities will be carried out outside the U.S. that might result in a leakage of the explicit and 
tacit knowledge related to that technology.  
In India Powerstar pursued a different strategy, developing engineering capacity to 
support engineering divisions of the company in the Triad.  Initially Powerstar contracted with 
an Indian engineering services firm to work on specific projects.  The goal was to set up a low-
cost engineering service center. Contracting out was viewed as a low-risk experiment.  After a 
few years, Powerstar decided to expand its engineering capacity in India. It established its own 
facility in the same city as the contractor, and (following an option in its agreement with the 
contractor) hired the contractor’s project team.  
At both sites the engineering activities gradually expanded. Engineering managers in the 
U.S. and Europe were not allowed to add headcount in the Triad because of cost pressures, so 
they added headcount in China and India. They increasingly placed “secondary” projects in 
China and India that they could not support in the U.S. or Europe. The engineering teams in 
China and India demonstrated their capacity to do more complex work, and actively sought more 
interesting projects. In some cases they initiated their own projects, or took over projects that 
seemed unattractive at other sites because of the costs of engineering human resources or 
differences in local markets. 
 The EnergySystems division we studied had initially opened an engineering office in 
China to provide engineering sales support to its Chinese sales office, offering technical 
assistance and systems configuration.  However, the Chinese government required the company 
to do more engineering work in China as a condition of obtaining government contracts.  
EnergySystems had a senior engineering manager who was a Chinese national interested in 
returning to China as he prepared for his retirement.  The company appointed him president of 
the China office, and assigned a younger Taiwanese national as the vice president. The 
Taiwanese vice president viewed his job in China as part of a career path that might lead to top 
management in the U.S. Two of the other senior managers had been based in the U.S. and the 
rest of the engineering staff was hired in China.  The extent of engineering work that would be 
done in China was still being determined at the time of our visit.  There was Chinese government 
pressure to increase the amount of engineering /innovation work, and the company saw this as a 
way of expanding capacity as well as assuring access to the local market. As mentioned above, 
EnergySystems acquired a relatively unsuccessful operation from a European MNE. At the time 
of our interviews it was aggressively addressing productivity issues at the plant – transferring 
management system from the U.S. not only to the plant, but also to its Chinese suppliers. A 
major objective was to upgrade the performance of these other firms. 
  Because EnergySystems’ technology is so specialized, it typically takes three to five 
years in the Triad for a new engineer to become a “contributor,” not much new engineering has 
been done at the site yet.  Still, EnergySystems was able to attract the best engineers in the 
Chinese labor market and from our interviews with them, it was clear that their goal is to become 
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a “center of excellence” providing leading edge engineering within EnergySystems.  The senior 
managers were not as confident about the site’s engineering capabilities, but had a “wait and see” 
attitude. 
 
 
3. Outcomes for MNEs: 
 
 Many of the MNE managers in our study admitted having concerns about where current 
trajectories are leading. They said they would not encourage their own children to pursue careers 
in engineering, because the more interesting work would no longer be done in the Triad, and that 
in any case wage pressures from offshore sites would make engineering an unattractive career. 
When we asked more than a dozen engineering managers at ALL-IT what would keep ALL-IT 
competitive with emerging Indian rivals, the managers said things like “closeness to customers” 
or that ALL-IT would always be the “systems integrator.” Yet, these responses seemed hollow. 
ALL-IT itself was bringing staff from its Indian contractors to solve customer problems (it no 
longer had its own staff who could do this) and it was becoming apparent to customers where the 
real expertise lie. Those at ALL-IT with skills in systems integration, we were told, had learned 
these skills by moving up through the ranks, starting with jobs that have virtually all been 
offshored, sometimes to other companies. These outsourcing companies would obtain content 
expertise they needed by hiring laid-off All-IT workers to perform the same outsourced functions 
these workers had previously performed for All-IT. 
 Interestingly, while these and other managers seemed fatalistic about the prospects for 
their careers and their companies, often the fatalism was not based on a technological or 
economic determinism. Some of the offshoring appeared to be occurring when (these managers 
claimed) a full cost accounting would not justify it. Some technology offshoring occurred simply 
because other technology activities had already been offshored. To be sure, some technology 
offshoring is almost certainly inevitable at this division, and it may even be beneficial for those 
working on sites in the U.S., but there is reason to believe too much is being offshored too 
quickly, with little careful consideration being given to broader issues that will affect the long-
term viability of ALL-IT.     
 One might ask, what are the core competencies of the MNEs in our study? What are the 
resources that will allow them to sustain competitive advantage? Managers at ALL-IT seem to 
hope that its relationships with suppliers will prove to be a key resource – but seems to be 
handing that resource over to rivals from India. So, too, as was mentioned, it seems to be 
allowing its strengths as a system integrator to atrophy.  
 It may be that PC Products has better prospects. It may prove to have created a valuable, 
difficult to imitate, resource by building up its network of technology entrepreneurial firms and 
maintaining its ties to top universities in China, India and elsewhere around the world. Still, we 
wonder about the prospects for the PCP main research campus in the United States. The PCP 
offices in India and China devoted to new product development are still relatively small, as are 
the projects they are working on.  One trend to watch, however, is that much of the current work 
is on independent projects with less reporting to the main research campus in the U.S. The Indian 
and Chinese offices are increasingly autonomous. The future expansion of these offices depends 
on the extent to which they are able to develop new products or product extensions with global 
applications. The offshore sites are not taking over core development activities from the U.S. 
teams, but the initiatives undertaken by PCP’s own sites and their vendors are focused on new 
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innovation.  The offshore sites hold the promise, or at least have the goal, of developing 
innovation more suitable for growing, emerging market economies. Additionally, as a number of 
U.S.-based and offshore-based interviewees remarked, the offshore sites may have the potential 
to be more innovative than the main campus because they are less constrained by existing 
frameworks. 
 At Powerstar the crucial resource seems to be a proprietary technology that it keeps 
closely guarded. Meanwhile pressures grow from Powerstar’s offshore sites to be given more 
challenging work. Will this lead to difficulty in retaining offshore personnel? And, what will 
replace the proprietary technology that will continue to sustain competitive advantage. 
EnergySystems has its highly acclaimed management systems. Perhaps this will prove to be 
sustainable. In any case the advantages of scale and scope once held by these companies count 
for much less than in a world of tightly integrated technology creation chains. 
  
DISCUSSION 
 
 These cases suggest that the process of offshoring is far less controlled and rational than 
normative theories of management strategy might lead one to expect. There is a substantial 
unplanned and unpredictable element in when, whether, how and where to offshore, such as the 
presence of valued expatriate employees who want to go back to their homeland to work. The 
motivating factors behind the offshoring of technology development and the processes by which 
it is pursued are incremental and opportunistic, with little concern about preserving or 
developing resources that might give the firm sustainable competitive advantage. Managers say 
they are pushed to focus on near-term results. When asked abut the company’s future a not-
uncommon response by midlevel and senior managers alike was a shrug of the shoulders and “I 
don’t know, but I’ll be retired by then ….”. 
 To be sure there are plausible rationales behind the offshoring projects we describe: to cut 
costs, to gain access to talent, to be allowed entry into promising markets. But when one looks 
more closely, one sees that less rational elements have importantly shaped the decisions. If Wall 
Street analysts believe that offshoring saves money, managers may feel pressure to offshore as 
much as possible, irrespective of any cost-benefit analysis. Some of the costs are not charged 
directly to a particular project and individual employees are forced to bear other costs such as 
extended work hours (regular international conference calls in the early morning or late evening) 
or travel time to coordinate geographically-distributed projects. The choice of a site may be 
based more on the desires of expatriate employees than on more systematic evaluations of 
various possibilities. Most of all, as resources are acquired or off-loaded, little thought seems to 
be given to the retention of resources that may be needed for the longer term sustenance of the 
firm.  
 In our interviews it seemed clear that decisions are often made to manage or respond to 
financial analysts’ perceptions and that share price increases offset increases in tangible and 
intangible project management costs or longer-term impacts. Alternatively, developing globally-
distributed organizations and capabilities may create a valuable set of assets that will be 
employed in different organizational forms and identities. This may be the dynamic we observe 
in transfers of key products to offshore companies and the acquisition of OEMs by their 
suppliers and offshore competitors, and in the development of firm identifies independent of 
national origin or location. 
 Our research also suggests a need to reconsider some theories on the relationship between 
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geography and technology development. The operating premise of firms, management 
consultants, and researchers has generally been that core activities, and particularly innovation 
activities that involve tacit knowledge, need to be geographically proximate to each other, to 
managers, and to new product development teams in the Triad nations, and sometimes to a 
particular region such as Silicon Valley (Lee, et al, 2000).  For these reasons, innovation 
activities have been considered to be geographically “sticky” (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996); 
Brown and Duguid, 2002; Cumbers and MacKinnon, 2004; Porter, 1998; Von Hippel, 1994). But 
the relative strength of the forces that cause stickiness and those that work to overcome it have 
been changing quickly (Cairncross, 2001).  
 For the “best and the brightest” emerging economy technologists and entrepreneurs, the 
attractions of life in the United States and of employment at Triad MNEs, as we saw in our 
interviews, has sharply declined. It should not be surprising that many Indians and Chinese 
would rather work in their home countries – assuming the opportunities there are comparable to 
those in the United States. Given the dynamic growth of China and India, it should also not be 
surprising that opportunities in those countries may be more attractive than those in the mature 
triad economies.   
 More generally, it seems clear, as described earlier, that innovation networks can be 
developed with increasing ease following the increased flexibility and permeability of 
organizational boundaries, and the development of organizational capabilities that allow firms to 
work first across organizations and second across geographical distance. As we have seen in 
some of our cases, this has allowed new entrepreneurial opportunities for emerging economy 
technologists. Following the reduction of the geographical and organizational constraints on the 
innovation value chain, the global diffusion of innovation activity has followed human capital, 
significantly reducing the availability of high-skilled labor in the U.S. 
 The offshore location of high tech activities by triad multinational is attracting 
widespread attention, but receiving less attention is the changing role of technology 
entrepreneurs in both the triad and in the emerging economies.  Our analysis of innovation shift 
finds that technology entrepreneurs now form part of the innovation/engineering value chain. 
Thus they are playing a role that is different from that of the EE contract manufacturers in 
previous waves of outsourcing. Contract manufacturers performed work that had literally been 
outsourced -- it was work transferred from within a firm to outside. The new acquisition of 
innovation involves activities that never were inside the firm and might never have been done 
there. It is only more recently that this has developed into a targeted innovation strategy.   
This innovation shift is more significant than just the offshoring of activities that were 
formerly integrated in the Triad-based sites of an MNE or in a Triad region such as Silicon 
Valley.  It involves the development of new innovation capacity and new types or directions of 
innovation, serving as both complements and substitutes for onshore innovation activity. It is 
important to understand this aspect of innovation capacity development in emerging economies.  
It is an innovation shift in that it goes beyond just developing domestic versus foreign human 
capital and R&D innovative capacity. This innovation shift is emerging from the geographic 
dispersion of “capacity” — know how, human capital, and fixed assets via MNEs.  Although 
some MNEs still regard their offshore sites and reliance on technology entrepreneurs as just 
another cost reduction strategy, others are undergoing more substantive organizational and 
strategic shifts that build on not just an additional but a different type of innovation capacity in 
the emerging markets.  Navi Radou (2006b) has characterized these firms as “Globally-Adaptive 
Organizations”. 
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 We have argued elsewhere (Lynn and Salzman, 2006; 2007) that changes in the strength 
and meaning of organizational, regional and national boundaries render many extant policy 
proposals obsolete. The exponential increase in the mobility of people, companies, and 
technologies makes obsolete policies that are based on the hope of capturing spillover benefits 
from investments in education or research. Thus we have argued against relying on efforts to 
have the U.S. concentrate on graduating more scientists and engineers than other countries or to 
monopolize technology. Sounder policies are based on understanding the world system and 
finding a place in it.  
 Our cases do suggest that the policies of emerging economies to attract foreign MNEs are 
succeeding in creating technology spin-off benefits. Not only are these policies resulting in jobs 
being created for their most talented people, which keeps them in the country and also brings 
back some who have left), but they are creating entrepreneurial opportunities for engineers and 
scientists. If the initial jobs and opportunities are beneath the qualifications of these talented 
people, there is a strong pressure for them to move up the value chain. 
In some respects there would seem to be nothing new about this “new” system. Large 
firms have often subcontracted work to small firms, or even families and individuals – with large 
variations in the degree of mutual gain involved. The main difference is the high technology now 
involved and the attendant dynamism of inputs and uncertainty of outcomes. This may give a 
new level of power and opportunity in these relationships to the subcontractors. The offshore 
strategies for innovation activities, unlike Business Process Outsourcing (BPO), involve more 
risk both because of the potential loss of intellectual property and because of the potential 
creation of competitors.  As a result, the MNE-technology entrepreneur networks that developed 
in the U.S. are not being mirrored offshore but, rather are evolving along their own path.  
The initial movement of technology activities to emerging economies by MNEs in our 
study was generally done on an experimental basis, usually offering few opportunities for new 
technology entrepreneurs.  The emerging economy entrepreneurs in our study typically 
established firms that initially engaged in activities with little technology content, though some 
had a strategy to develop higher-level work.  In the case of the Indian IT industry, for example, 
most of the small offshore firms we interviewed had their origins in the 1990s. They began by 
unsuccessfully attempting to do product development, and then transformed themselves into 
offshore IT firms. Now that development work is beginning to move offshore from the Triad, 
and local emerging economy markets are rapidly growing, some of these firms are moving into 
component product development. As part of this they are doing engineering/innovation work for 
the products of a large multinational firm. Similar to the U.S.-based technology entrepreneurs, 
their strategy is dependent upon the MNEs. A major difference is that their development work is 
being done within a contractual relationship rather than “on spec” and with the goal that the 
company will be acquired.  In the IT field we did not observe, nor did we hear of, technology 
entrepreneurs working on independent innovations with the intention that their company would 
later be sold. In fact, the reverse pattern seems to be a possibility as suggested by the acquisition 
of the U.S. IT services firm Keane by Caritor, a privately-held Indian outsourcing firm (Wall 
Street Journal, 2007). 
 Another difference between offshore technology entrepreneurship in emerging economies 
and that based in the U.S. or Europe is the need to account for the potential risk of creating 
competitors.  In the Triad nations it would be unusual for a small supplier to use its relationship 
with an MNE customer to acquire technology and knowledge, and then enter into direct 
competition with the MNE. In countries like China and India this is a real risk: IP regimes are 
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less rigorous, the explosiveness of domestic market growth offers tremendous opportunities, 
there may be strong financial and other support from domestic governments, and monitoring by 
the MNEs is much less effective. One well-known example is Huawei in China, which began as 
a parts supplier and distributor for Cisco, and then began to develop its own products, allegedly 
using proprietary Cisco designs. After Cisco severed all ties with them, Huawei developed a 
partnership with 3Com, supposedly with an understanding that there would be only limited direct 
competition in just a few markets.  However, Huawei appears to be developing into a global 
company that will soon be directly competing in all global markets with Cisco and 3Com.  For 
these reasons, MNEs may want to be more cautious about working with offshore technology 
entrepreneurs on core innovative activities.  It should also be noted that, at least for now, MNEs 
may still find it easier to attract innovators in the emerging economies to work directly for 
MNEs, and perhaps have less need to rely on entrepreneurs. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 A disjunctive “innovation shift” to emerging economies is rapidly occurring. This 
innovation shift is disjunctive in that it includes a shift in the control of innovation value chains 
away from Triad Multinationals, and away from the Triad – rather than enhancing control by the 
Triad Multinationals as happened in the past. Often the MNE may still be the locus of 
innovation, but in new geographies and in a globally dispersed organization. 
 Triad MNEs are being driven to offshore technology development not only by 
opportunities to cut costs, gain access to human and other technological resources, and enter new 
markets, but also by the desire to appear to gain these benefits and because once the offshoring 
begins, it sometimes takes on a life of its own. There is reason to believe that much of the 
offshoring would not be justified by a careful cost-benefit analysis. 
 In this process of offshoring technology development firms are not following precepts of 
strategic management that would have them protect core competencies and the resources needed 
for the sustainability of their firms. Interdependencies between functions and activities are 
ignored as functions are moved offshore. 
 Geography still matters for technology, but the forces of attraction and retention are 
changing. The forces that caused high-end technology to be concentrated in the Triad are 
weakening as emerging economy entrepreneurs and technologists find it easier to move their 
activities to their home countries. Not surprisingly, many of these people want to go home. The 
technology creating and training missions of U.S. universities are, at least in some cases, less 
supported by U.S. firms than in the past, while emerging economy universities grow in strength 
(often in partnership with globalizing U.S. universities and firms) – again reducing the relative 
attraction of the U.S. as a center of technology creation. Additionally, the emerging economies 
are also developing unique advantages for innovation beyond low costs and the availability of 
human capital. They are drawing on different traditions to develop new approaches to 
technological innovation, different engineering frameworks, and other distinctive attributes that 
promise to make unique contributions to global innovation.  
 As geographical boundaries and attractive forces are changing, so, too, are organizational 
boundaries. Core technological innovation activities are carried out far away from MNE 
headquarters (and perhaps far from the observation and control of headquarters). Some of these 
activities are entrusted to other firms. 
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 All of this implies that policy-makers in the Triad need to re-think policies. It may not 
just be jobs that are moving offshore, but also opportunities for entrepreneurs. Attracting 
outstanding science and technology students from emerging economies may not provide the 
same benefits as in the past (when many could be counted on to stay and enrich the economy), 
though it may provide other benefits (such as helping U.S. science and technology students learn 
how to function in the changing global economy).  
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